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SECURITY INFORMATION

27 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT : Meeting on 25 February 1953 of PM Staff Representative and Area Divisions

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1. Discussion at the meeting between [REDACTED] and Area representatives centered on the question of how Area Divisions can and should select emergency situations in each of their countries which would require paramilitary aid in order to fulfill the requirements of [REDACTED] recent request for this information.

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2. Several Area Divisions contended that the emergency situations should be given to them as assumptions on which to base their estimates. Any other procedure would be fortune-telling and not a sound basis for planning, they said. One area explained that there was no instruction as to whether the emergency situation should be a "possibility" or a "probability," or where to draw the line, all of which materially affects the selection. One contended planning for a theoretical emergency picked out of the sky is potentially dangerous because such plans get into the files, sometimes into the field, and several years later can turn up and make the authors look foolish, at best.

3. The suggestion was made that the problem be solved by asking NIE to delineate the emergencies. This was overruled because it takes six weeks to get an estimate from NIE, and requesting one for every country in CIA operation would create a major jam.

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4. Another suggestion was to use "hot war" as an emergency basis. [REDACTED] pointed out that this would not work because policy on Pentagon-CIA coordination in event of hot war has not been agreed upon.

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5. [REDACTED] suggested trying the budget approach to settle the question--that is, ask each country to select what paramilitary resources it could best use if it were given an extra allotment of a few million dollars from a central paramilitary "kitty." One area's reply was that such an offer of funds would be refused because they weren't needed. Another held that fund requests had to be related to policy and capabilities and that approach would therefore be unrealistic.

6. While several

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6. While several areas stated their country desks felt strongly that they could not make any sensible logical emergency assumptions for, for example, Poland and Austria, other areas said they could choose several—one mentioned ten—but the problem was to pick one.

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7. With time running short, it was decided rather casually and without formal agreement, that Area Divisions would bring lists of possible emergencies to [REDACTED] who would aid in the selection of the situation for each country to be used in making the estimates requested.

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